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The Privatization of the national public utilities that took place almost a decade ago in
Argentina seem to be explained by the persisting deficits of the enterprises, a general
dissatisfaction with their performance and the difficulties government faced in their
control. During the period of private management, companies restructured their revenues
by both regrouping consumers and raising their two-part tariffs unevenly, increased the
number of customers and achieved perceptible quality improvements. For assessing the
impact of the reforms in the telecomunications, electricity, natural gas and sanitation
services upon residential consumers’ economic well being, welfare changes of the initial
consumers and the surplus of the newcomers are estimated using household level data from
the Gran Buenos Aires. The results obtained suggest that the direction as well as the
intensity of welfare changes differ across income groups and services and that magnitudes
vary according to the rigidity of demands; the benefits for the newcomers also differ across
services but they seem to have had little significance in all cases, except in water and
sewage.
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1. Introduction
The privatization of public enterprises began in Argentina in 1989, a decade after the
process was launched in the UK, and seems to have been lead by the same reasons. In fact,
the motivations behind the programme consisted of the negative effect on certain
macroeconomic variables caused by the frequent need to use public funds to finance
service extension or merely to cover firm’s operating deficits, the general dissatisfaction
with public management performance mainly characterized by the poor quality of the
services, and the difficulties faced by the government in controlling them. These factors, as
well as the transformation of some monopolistic activities into competitive ones made
possible by technical progress and the contribution of new developments in economic
analysis, have moulded public opinion to believe that the state should leave market-
oriented activities to the private sector concentrating on areas where private involvement
would not be possible, and consequently to support the programme.
Furthermore, several macroeconomic imbalances, such as hyperinflation, declining
economic activity and large fiscal deficits (to a great extent explained by public utilities
losses), placed privatization at the centre of a broader programme of reforms. This critical
economic situation had two important consequences. On the one hand, it put pressure on
the privatization process by constraining public policies. This was translated into weak
regulatory mechanisms that initially ignored the market structures emerging as a
consequence of privatization (although more rigid regulations were adopted later and
competition was encouraged by splitting up the utilities being privatized). On the other
hand, the prevailing economic situation of the country prompted significant tariff increases
during the preprivatization period and the progressive elimination of cross-subsidies. Both
measures were intended to achieve more cost reflective prices in order to ensure private
operators a reasonable rate of return.
The purpose of this paper is to assess, after a decade of reforms, the welfare changes and
the distributional impact associated with the privatization of telecomunications, electricity,
natural gas, and water and sewerage services of the Gran Buenos Aires area. It is
interesting to focus the analysis on Buenos Aires because it is the site of the earliest
reforms and also because it is the region where privatization has been completed for all
four utilities. In addition, a third of the country’s population is concentrated around this
area; it also accounts for half of the country’s industrial production and an even more
important share of the services’ output. The reform of public utilities in Argentina is still
incomplete as many provincial water and electricity distribution companies are still in the
hands of the public sector. The results of this study, however, are highly indicative of the
changes to be expected in provinces where reforms have already been implemented or are
forthcoming.
The paper is organized into five sections. Section two briefly describes the main aspects of
the privatization process of utilities in Argentina with an emphasis on the restructuring of
the markets involved. The third section presents and analyses the evolution of the structure
and level of residential tariffs from the start of the reforms to the present. The fourth
section introduces the methodology adopted for estimating both changes in consumer
surplus for users at the time of reforms and the expected welfare effects for newcomers to2
the system as a result of privatization. It also describes the data and discusses the results.
Finally, the last section summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. An overview of the privatization programme
The reform of the utility sector began in Argentina in 1989 when the Peronist Party, having
won the presidency and both houses of congress, launched a programme of structural
reforms. The legal and conceptual framework for privatization was quickly established
through national legislation of State Reform Law (No. 23,696) and Economic Emergency
Law (No. 23,697). These were complemented with other decrees and ministry resolutions.
In view of the prevailing economic environment at that time, it is not surprising that
privatization was not only motivated by efforts to improve the performance of the markets,
but that it was also fiscally driven. Furthermore, with the urgent aim of improving fiscal
performance, the reform programme followed a decentralized implementation, albeit with
central monitoring.
Two phases can clearly be distinguished within the process. The first period lasted until
1991 when the government implemented a very stringent stabilization plan. Reforms were
brought about almost exclusively through executive decrees without sufficient
consideration to the organization of the markets and to the subsequent development of
good regulatory frameworks. These oversights hindered the process of privatization of the
telecom company. In contrast, second-phase reforms were carried out through legislative
action which, on the one hand, defined more precisely the conditions for privatization and,
on the other, improved the regulatory norms prior to the transfer of public utilities.
2.1 The scope of the privatization programme
The majority of the state-owned enterprises were privatized between 1989 and 1993,
following a two-stage procedure. The first stage was the approval for privatization from the
congress. The second stage was the division of companies into different business units, the
cancellation of debts between firms, and a reduction in the number of employees. Table 1
shows that the proceeds from the privatization process totalled US$18 billion (7.6 percent
of the 1993 GDP), consisting of US$9.3 billion in cash, 6 billion recovered from public
debt at market value, and 2.6 billion from corporate debts transferred with the firms.
However, the nominal value of the debt redeemed was US$15 billion and the total equity
value of the privatized companies, estimated at initial stock values, rose to US$26 billion.1
As Table 1 indicates, proceeds from the telecom, electricity and gas utilities were essential
for Argentina’s economy, and accounted for US$10.7 billion, or about 60 percent of the
total income generated by privatization.2 Transfer of the telecom company produced
US$3.5 billion, two-thirds in cash (mainly from the stock market sale of the government-
owned share) and the rest in national debt bonds that traded at one-quarter of their market
value. Privatization of the electricity and gas utilities procured US$4.1 and 3 billion,
1 Out of this last amount, US$12.7 billion was obtained through concessions or direct sales and 5.3 billion
from flotation on stock markets. The 8 billion balance remained in the hands of the national and some
provincial governments.
2 The water and sewerage company assets, on the other hand, were given in concession to the bidder offering
the largest tariff reduction.3
respectively. As these figures reflect, cash bids were important, the value of traded debt
increased about 50 percent of its nominal value and firms were transferred with their
corporate debts. Moreover, at the company level, the proceeds of the sales derived from
these utilities was topped only by the sale of the former national oil company, YPF SA,
still the largest firm in the country.
Table 1

















Telecom Sale 2.271 1.257 – 3.528 5.000 3.919
Airlines Sale 260 483 – 743 1.610 892
Railways Concession – – – – – –
Electricity Sale 855 1.853 1.476 4.185 3.707 6.439
Ports Sale/concession 14 – – 14 – 14
Roads Concession – – – – – –
Radio/television Concession 14 – – 14 – 14
Oil, exploration Contracts 2.041 – – 2.041 – 3.205
Oil, YPF Sale 3.040 884 – 3.924 1.271 6.711
Water & sewerage Concession – – – – – –
Natural gas Sale 300 1.541 1.110 2.951 3.082 3.956
Petrochemical Sale 55 28 – 83 140 265
Shipyards Sale 60 – – 60 – 60
Steel Sale 143 22 – 165 42 199
Conductors Sale 12 3 – 15 4 15
Real estate Sale 184 – – 184 – 184
Others Sale/concession 65 2 – 68 12 68
Total 9.313 6.074 2.586 17.973 14.867 25.940
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services (1996: 23).
Notes: (1) The concessions of railways, water and sanitation services and roads were granted according to
bids based on investment programmes.
2.2 Main aspects of the reforms of the utilities
Only two months after the new government took office, executive decree Decreto No.
731/89 initiated the reform of telecom services by making the privatization of Empresa
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel) possible. Argentinean telecom services, which
date back to 1880, were provided by more than thirty private operators until the mid 1940s,
when the companies were gradually merged and nationalized as the ENTel. Before
privatization, this state-owned company controlled about 90 percent of the country’s
telephone lines, with hundreds of small co-operatives and one private company operating
in six provinces (Compañía Argentina de Teléfonos) controlling the rest. Despite several
nationalization attempts, Compañía Argentina de Teléfonos continued to service these six
provinces under uncertain licences until 1992.4
In the transfer to private ownership, ENTel was divided into two holding companies,
Telecom SA in the north, and Telefónica SA in the south, each with a licence to provide
basic telephone services in these geographic regions. The scheme also contemplated the
division of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area into two zones (Decreto 59/90 and 60/90).3
Sixty percent of the holding companies were sold through competitive international
bidding, 30 percent floated on the stock market between 1991-2 and the remaining 10
percent reserved for ENTel employees. Licences for these regional monopolies were
granted for seven years with the option of renewal for three more years, subject to
achieving certain performance targets. By the end of the year 2000, these companies would
still have a license to operate, but without exclusive rights.
The regulation of telecoms was originally entrusted to the Comisión Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones, an agency created with the specific aim of ensuring regularity, equity
and continuity of the services, to promote universal access to basic telephone services and
to encourage competition in non-exclusive segments. This office, in spite of its
transformation in 1997 into the Comisión Nacional de Comunicaciones, had very little
independence because the Communications Secretariat retained power to intervene in its
activities. Hence, the overall management of the process and the implementation of a
regulatory regime were hindered by the fact that the responsibility, instead of being in the
hands of a specialized regulatory agency, was shared, or at times totally taken over, by the
government. This was the most serious drawback with ENTel’s privatization, and provided
a valuable future lesson for the reform of energy utilities.
Reorganization of the electricity sector began in January 1992 with Electricity Law No.
24,065 and certain accompanying norms. By that time, government-owned public utilities
dominated: Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBA), a generation and
distribution company, served the country’s largest urban conglomerate, and Agua y
Energía Eléctrica (AyE) operated numerous generation plants, transmission lines, and
distribution systems in the provinces. In addition, Hidronor, managing large hydroelectric
stations in the Comahue region, transported energy to Buenos Aires. The government also
operated nuclear power plants and participated in some important international
hydroelectric ventures.
The reform of this sector, oriented toward fostering competition in the generation markets
and regulation for transmission and distribution, produced two main results. It created, on
the one hand, a wholesale electricity market, a regulatory framework and a new regulatory
office, the Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad (ENRE). On the other hand,
companies being transferred to the private sector were split into smaller units. Thus,
SEGBA was dismantled with the sale of five firms specializing in generation only and
three in distribution, including Edenor SA and Edesur SA These two companies were
privatized in September 1992, and their sale value accounted for more than one-third of the
proceeds from the entire sector; currently these firms serve the Gran Buenos Aires area.
Privatization of AyE started a few months later when the first of its 16 power stations was
transferred. Hidronor was next, with the transfer of four generation plants in the middle of
3 These two firms have also been entrusted, in equal parts, with the shares of two new companies (later
denominated Startel and Telintar) created to provide value added services and to operate international
services, respectively.5
1993. Privatization of the national grid company and five regional firms was launched
almost concurrently. Thermal power stations were sold and hydroelectric ones as well as
the transmission lines were granted in concession.4
Privatization and the new regulatory framework seem to have had favourable effect on the
electricity market. In generation, there are currently more than 40 companies operating
across the country (80 percent are privately owned). In electric transmission, the national
grid is covered by one high-voltage company, as well as numerous regional ones. Firms are
forbidden to trade electricity and have to operate under an open access regime. In
distribution, there are more than 30 companies (although 40 percent are still managed by
provincially-owned enterprises) enjoying monopoly rights in their concession area.
Competition is limited to large customers who buy directly on bilateral contracts or from
the bulk market.
Prior to restructuring, the natural gas industry consisted of two companies: YPF SA, the
single upstream company with a gas exploration and production monopoly, and Gas del
Estado, a monopolistic transmission and distribution company which originated in 1945
with nationalization of Compañía Primitiva de Gas, a British-owned company founded in
the middle of the nineteenth century. Concurrently with the electricity sector, the
restructuring of the gas industry began in June 1992, when the Natural Gas Law (No.
24,076) opened the way for privatization and complete deregulation of the extraction and
production of gas, allowing private companies to manage all gas fields in Argentina.
However, the price of natural gas at well-head was not liberalized until January 1994.
Gas del Estado was reassembled on broadly geographical basis into two high-pressure
transmission companies and eight regional distribution firms which were franchised a
concession area in December 1992.5 Distribuidora de Gas Metropolitana S.A. (Metrogas)
and Distribuidora de Gas Buenos Aires Norte S.A. (BAN), currently serving the Gran
Buenos Aires, represented about 40 percent of the total value of gas distribution firms at
the time of reform. Concessions were granted for thirty-five years with an option of
another ten and were preceded by the creation of a new regulatory institution, the Ente
Nacional Regulador del Gas (ENARGAS). Since privatization, high-pressure gas
transportation has been handled by transmission companies that are prohibited from
trading gas. These companies must ensure free access without discrimination and must
subject their tariffs to regulation. Distribution firms, on the other hand, are responsible for
both low-pressure transmission and gas supply in their franchised areas but, as competition
is limited to large consumers, they also enjoy a de facto monopoly in retailing gas to small
customers.
Water and sewerage services in the country’s major cities were traditionally provided by
the state-owned enterprise, Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN). In some provinces,
however, these services were, and still are, run by municipalities and co-operatives that
have always operated their own systems. In 1980 the national government decentralized
4 In all cases, the economic units resulting from the splitting up of the public enterprises have been organized
under limited liability (Sociedad Anónima SA). 10 percent of the shares were granted to the employees
under the ‘Programa de Propiedad Participada’ scheme, and the rest transferred to the private sector.
5 The operation of a ninth distribution company was authorized six years later.6
the control of water and sanitation systems under its management by delegating
responsibility to the provinces, retaining, however, control of the remnants of OSN to serve
the Gran Buenos Aires metropolitan area. Privatization in the early 90s, within the context
of structural reforms, initially focussed on OSN, but expanded to water and sanitation
services operated by local authorities. In fact, the largest and best-documented incident is
the May 1993 transfer, in which OSN’s responsibility for Buenos Aires’ water and
sanitation services was handed over to the Aguas Argentinas SA consortium under a thirty-
year concession contract, with the main objective of reducing the government’s operating
costs and minimizing consumer tariffs. No cash outlay was needed and once the technical
and financial qualifications were complied with, the concession was awarded to the
consortium offering the largest reduction over the prevailing public tariffs. The
government’s regulatory role is now in hands of the Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios
Sanitarios (ETOSS), an independent regulatory agency responsible for monitoring the
concessionaire and enforcing the contract and regulations.
Since 1993 reforms have been extended to other activities, including postal services,
national savings and insurance companies, as well as airports. Others are being
contemplated. There are plans to include nuclear stations, and to open the
telecomunications market to full competition. Provincial authorities, guided by the
experience at the national level, have embarked on plans to privatize water and electric
companies and power stations. In gas, reforms are being extended to the more remote
areas. But the fact remains that at the present time, basic telephony is provided by
Telefónica de Argentina and Telecom, and water and sewerage services by Aguas
Argentinas. Regulation is weak on the part of telephony service, but it is more elaborated
for water and sanitation. The splitting-up of publicly-owned generation plants and
deregulation of markets at the well-head may well have induced a competitive environment
for the generation of electricity and gas production. Transmission and distribution are
carefully regulated, and in many cases tariffs across firms seem to converge.
3. The evolution of residential tariffs for privatized utilities
In the prereform period, pricing policies of traditional utilities in Argentina were motivated
by the political goals: improving income distribution through public service tariffs,
containing the impact of inflation on the cost of living, and facilitating access to the
services for low-income households. The negative effects of this policy on the financial
situation of the enterprises were offset with allocations from the national treasury, taxes
and cross-subsidies between customer categories, as well as the continuing neglect of the
quality of the services. Consequently, privatization of public utilities introduced changes
both in the level and the structure of tariffs. These sought to formulate more cost-reflective
schedules, to eliminate the complex range of taxes and, in general, to adopt some form of
price cap regulation.
In the case of telecoms, during the period between January and November 1990, when the
rules and timetable governing ENTel’s privatization were being approved, tariffs were
adjusted on a monthly basis to reflect changes in the domestic CPI. The pricing policy
applied afterwards was based on a price cap scheme that went through different phases that
became known as transition, exclusivity and extension. During the transition phase, the
price cap was established with an X factor equal to zero and a clause to adjust tariffs every7
six months according to the evolution of the CPI. During the exclusivity phase from
November 1991 to November 1996, the X factor was set at 2 percent per year, the cost of
the pulse was fixed in dollars, domestic CPI was replaced by that of the US, and firms
were allowed to compensate reductions in tariffs for long-distance calls (national and
international) with increases in the tariffs for local calls. These adjustments increased
rentals by about 50 percent in March 1992.6 During the last phase starting in November
1996 with the liberalization of the international calls market and authorization to rebalance
tariffs, companies reduced long-distance and international call rates but also eliminated
free pulses and increased the value of rentals by over 40 percent.
It is relatively complicated to analyse the development of basic telephony costs from the
time of public ownership to the present because the two-part tariff is based not only on the
price of the pulse, and of the rental (proportional to the former), but also on the existence
and the number of ‘free’ pulses and the ‘speed of computation’. The latter, depending on
traffic congestion and the distance of the call, determines the number of pulses consumed
per minute. Therefore, the analysis of residential tariffs considers not only the rental and
the price of the pulse but also the expenditure of a typical consumer, which is obtained by
adding to the rental the price of the pulse, multiplied by the average consumption (minus
the number of pulses supplied free of charge).
Figure 1
The evolution of rental and pulse rates, and expenditures for residential telecom










Nov-90 Nov-91 Nov-92 Nov-93 Nov-94 Nov-95 Nov-96 Nov-97 Nov-98 Nov-99
Rental Pulse Expenditure
Note: prices = 1 at the date of transfer.
6 No index corrections have been made since March 1991 because the convertibility law precludes inflation
adjustment clauses in contracts.8
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the rental, the price of the pulse and the expenditure of a
typical consumer, in all cases deflated by the CPI. The reduction in real tariffs achieved
during the first year of the postprivatization period (explained by a significant increase in
retail prices) was corrected with an adjustment to the rental at the start of the second phase.
Despite maintaining these tariffs in real terms, a new increase in the rental at the very
beginning of the third phase brought about, in the presence of stable consumer prices,
another real tariff increase. As a result, since privatization, the real cost of rental has risen
more than 50 percent and expenditure of the typical consumer has increased about
3 percent, though pulse price has fallen almost 25 percent (or only 10 percent considering
the elimination of free pulses and some changes in the speed of computation).
Figure 2
Evolution of the fixed and unit charges (before tax) for residential consumers of electricity
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In the case of electricity, the regulatory body is responsible for setting tariffs at different
levels. At the wholesale level, generators supply distributors and large consumers in the
term contract and spot markets.7 Regulations enforce a maximum price for the
transmission stage, which is adjusted with an index to reflect fluctuations in wholesale and
retail US prices, as well as changes in the operating conditions. Finally, tariffs charged by
distributors to final consumers are calculated on the basis of the wholesale energy price
(although firms can also pass-through power charges and spot-price changes to tariffs), the
transmission charge and their distribution costs. As power contracts for residential
consumers do not exist, distribution costs at this level are recovered through a standing as
well as a unit charge. Moreover, energy tariffs are set in US dollars and adjusted every
three months to correspond to changes in both the US wholesale and consumer price
indexes, and also to changes in seasonal prices. The current pricing scheme was
7 At wholesale level, firms enjoy agreements that allow uncontrained free price negotiations, whereas in the
spot market hourly tariffs are established according to the marginal cost of the optimal dispatch.9
established in the regulatory framework at the time of concession and was to last for ten
years.
Figure 2 shows the impact of adjustments in Edenor’s residential tariffs (which are almost
identical to Edesur’s) for two types of consumers: those with an average maximum
consumption of 150 kWh per month and those exceeding this amount. In both cases,
charges have been deflated by the CPI. As can be seen, from 1993 to 1994, tariffs charged
to low-demand consumers rose due to increases of more than 20 percent in both fixed and
unit charges. However, unit charges for high-demand consumers decreased. Since then,
real tariffs have stabilized, even though few smaller adjustments have been necessary
because of US inflation and also because of the seasonality of electricity prices on the
wholesale market. Consequently, a comparison of initial and final real consumer tariffs
shows that the fixed and unit charges for low-demand consumers rose by 50 percent and by
17 percent respectively. In contrast, fixed charges for high-demand consumers increased
only slightly, while variable charges decreased by about 33 percent.
Since privatization, tariffs charged by distribution firms in the gas industry are subject to
regulation with a RPI-X+K-type price cap system, where RPI is the consumer price index
of the US, X the efficiency factor, and K the so-called investment factor.8 Price reviews are
scheduled every five years, tariffs are converted into US dollars and adjusted every January
and July to reflect US inflation. These adjustments do not include gas price deviations at
well-head because these have already been introduced from 1994 directly to tariffs in May
and October (that is, at the start of the winter and summer seasons). This means that tariffs
are adjusted four times a year. Furthermore, the X and K were set equal to zero at
privatization, although the first factor was reset at the 1997 price review to less than
1 percent per annum.
The evidence available for this industry suggests that Gas del Estado’s tariffs were
insufficient to recover its operating costs and that cross-subsidies between different classes
of customers and across regions in all probability existed. It is therefore not surprising that
privatization was accompanied by changes in the level as well as in the structure of tariffs.
In fact, a new system, which classifies consumers according to consumption characteristics
(frequency and volume) replaced the earlier categorization of commercial, industrial and
general consumers.9 In the case of residential consumers, the two-part tariff with a
standing charge and unit charge was maintained but a uniform unit charge replaced the
earlier charge made of four increasing blocks. In addition, a minimum payment was
introduced. This may have discouraged moderate users from connecting to the system
because the effect replicates that of a higher rental charge.10
8 The aim was to provide financing for improvements in the service and to reflect, in the tariffs, the cost of
new investments in expansion and operation of the system.
9 Some of these changes had already been adopted before privatization.
10 The minimum bill exceeds the fixed charge by an amount which is equivalent to 18m3 of gas, while
average consumption during a period of minimal demand is about 30m3 per month. The piped gas service is
the only utility to impose a minimum bill.10
Figure 3 gives the evolution of gas prices (fixed and the unit charges) for Metrogas (which
are similar to BAN’s prices), deflated with the CPI. As is shown, during the first year of
private management, these charges rose between 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively.
Both charges increased again in 1994. The increases in the variable unit charge are mainly
due to fluctuations of well-head prices post-liberalization. Price fluctuation has stabilized
since then, in spite of small changes resulting from the semi-annual adjustment based on
US inflation and developments in seasonal gas prices. Finally, the resetting of the X factor
is probably responsible for the considerable drop in variable charges in 1998. Overall,
these factors add up to an increase of about 10 percent in the standing charge and of
20 percent in the unit charge of gas in average during the postprivatization period. This
outcome could have been expected because the alignment of tariffs to economic costs had
benefited large customers and interruptible users at the expense of the small domestic
customers who had enjoyed subsidized rates.
Figure 3
Evolution of the fixed and unit charges (before tax) for residential consumers of
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Water and sanitation services provided by Aguas Argentinas to residential customers are
charged according to a flat-rate tariff which applies to 90 percent of users, whereas the rest
pay according to their metered consumption only. The flat-rate tariff scheme resembles a
property tax because it is based on a ‘general tariff’ plus certain property criteria (size of
lot, roofed area, location and quality of dwelling). The second type of arrangement,
metered consumption, consists of two elements: the fixed charge and the unit charge,
which becomes applicable once the customer exceeds the free consumption threshold. The
tariff level, set in May 1993, has been adjusted only twice: in June 1994 with a 13.5
percent increase and in May 1998 with a 5.31 percent increase. Both increases were the11
result of tariff reviews undertaken in accordance with the terms of the concession
contract.11
At the beginning of the postprivatization period, residential consumers incorporated in the
network were billed for an ‘infrastructure’ charge plus a second amount for the connection
itself. However, since these access payments were obstructing expansion of the network
into the poorest areas, the contract was renegotiated in November 1997. The former
‘infrastructure’ payment was replaced with a ‘charge for universal services’ (SU) which
was applied to all users. The ‘connection charge’ was transformed into a ‘charge for
joining the service’ (CIS) and was payable in instalments.12 As a result, the bimonthly
expenditure for a typical consumer for non-metered water and sewerage service, which at
the time of the transfer was US$25 rose to US$29.84 at the end of 1999.13
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the private management of utilities on
consumer welfare. Table 2 shows the initial and final tariff levels. The initial tariff level
corresponds to the tariff applied during the month the private takeover took place14. This
information is used to examine changes in the welfare of residential consumers and in the
monthly expenditure for a ‘typical consumer’. The selection of the index for deflating the
tariffs constitutes an additional difficulty because retail prices increased much more than
wholesale prices, and wholesale prices increased much more than the nominal exchange
rate. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that wholesale prices would probably reflect the
evolution of the costs of the services more accurately, consumer prices are used here.
The first two columns show the nominal levels of the fixed and variable charges, the third
column shows the level of expenditure for a typical consumer, while the last column
summarizes the evolution of the CPI. Nominal prices rose from a minimum of 19 percent
for water and sewerage (reflecting an increase from $0.0279 to $0.0333) to a maximum of
289 percent in the case of the telecoms’ rental charge (climbing from $3.40 to $13.23 per
month). As the adjustments made to the fixed and unit charges were of a varying intensity,
they also triggered an important change in the composition of the tariffs. The share of fixed
11 The basic bimonthly tariff for the non-metered service is calculated making TBB =TG×K×Z×(SC×E+ST/10),
where TG is the tariff value, K a coefficient used for its adjustment (and equal to 0,731 at the time of the
reform), Z and E coefficients that correspond to the zone where the property is located and its quality, ST the
size of the lot and SC the roofed area; the resulting figure must exceed a minimum. The tariff for the metered
service is TBM = TBB/2+K×TU×(Q – QB) where K has the same meaning as before, TU is the price for each
cubic meter of water, Q the number of meters consumed and QB the number of free meters allowed. In May
1993, TG and TU were set at US$0.0279 and US$0.33 perm3 for the water only service, and to double
amounts when both services are provided.
12 The SU was set at US$2.01 per each 2-month period for each service and for all customers, whereas the
CIS was set at US$4 for each service, applicable only to new customers and, although included in the bill, is
payable for five years. New negotiations on the expansion of the services incorporated a ‘charge for
environmental improvements’ (MA) of US$1.98 per each 2-month period (for water only or both services)
from November 1998.
13 It is assumed here that the typical consumer’s dwelling is located on a 400m2 lot, has a roofed area of
150m2 and with average location and quality coefficients of 1.51 and 2.20, respectively.
14 The initial tariff level may reflect changes introduced during the public ownership to reflect economic
costs prior to the transfer.12
charges for a typical expenditure rose from 23 percent to 33 percent for telecoms, from 17
percent to 21 percent for low-demand electricity consumers and from 29 percent to 40
percent on the part of high-demand electricity consumers. The share for gas, however,
declined slightly, going from 27 percent to 25 percent.
Table 2




Per unit Total expenditure (1) CPI
Telecoms (pulse rate)
November 1990 6.80 0.02479 30.10 0.393
December 1999 26.46 0.04690 79.93 1.000
Percentage change 289% 89% 162% 154%
Electricity (2 (kwh)
September 1992 2.54 13.04 0.061 0.056 14.74 44.40 0.872
December 1999 4.30 15.58 0.080 0.042 20.30 39.10 1.000
Percentage change 69% 19% 31% -25% 38% -10% 15%
Natural gas
December 1992 6.29 0.1080 23.57 0.890
December 1999 7.61 0.1432 30.52 1.000
Percentage change 21% 33% 29% 12%





Percentage change 19% 19% 7%
Source: ENARGAS (2000), ENRE (2000), ETOSS (2000), Ferro (1999), FLACSO (1998) and Secretaría de
Energía y Minería (2000).
Notes: (1) Typical bimonthly consumption is estimated at 1140 pulses for telecoms, 200 and 560 kWh for
small- and large-demand users of electricity, respectively, and 160m3 for gas (electricity and
gas tariffs at the initial level are valid for both firms, but final tariffs are representative of Edenor
y Metrogas, even though they are identical with the rates of the other firm);
(2) Both rates are given: low-demand residential rate (first figure) and the high-demand rate
(second figure).
(3) Basic bimonthly tariff for water or sewerage.
Finally, Figure 4 summarizes the changes in real utility tariffs obtained with the CPI
deflation. The Figure shows that (i) for telephone services, the fall in the pulse was linked
to a notable increase in the rental value; (ii) the pronounced increase in the fixed charge for
electricity was accompanied by a significant rise in the variable rate for low-demand
customers; (iii) real changes in gas have been less significant but that the evolution of the
unit charge was more dynamic than that of the fixed charge, and (iv) the lowest tariff
adjustment (although new charges were added) was in water and sanitation services. The
figure shows that real increases have been less severe for the utilities most recently
affected by reforms. This is probably due to the fact that the continually decreasing
inflation rate enabled the state-owned utilities to recover their real tariffs. It is worth13
mentioning that if, instead, nominal tariffs had been deflated with the wholesale price
index or with the exchange rate, real increases would have been higher than those given
above. For example, with the wholesale price index, the standing charge and the pulse
increased 123% and 30 percent, respectively.
Figure 4
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4. Changes in the economic welfare of residential consumers
The results of the analysis in the previous section suggest that privatization has been
associated with a significant increase in the level of tariffs that varies across sectors. In
addition, the reforms seem to have affected some consumers more severely than others.15
In order to measure the impact of these adjustments on the well being of residential
consumers in general and on certain specific groups, households were grouped according
to their income and then changes in consumer surplus, following Waddams Price and
Hancock (1998), were measured as:
dS = (P1 –P 2)Q1 +½ ( P 1 –P 2)(Q2 –Q 1)
where Pi and Qi, for i = 1,2 are the prices and quantities consumed before and after
reforms. Multiplying and dividing the first term of the right hand side by P1, and replacing
(Q2–Q 1) by dQ, it is possible to obtain:
15 It is important to note that significant improvements in service quality were obtained during private
management. For example, the communications network was completely digitized and delays for repairs
were reduced from 23 days in 1991 to 2 days by the end of 1999. Interruptions in electricity were shortened
considerably, the pipe pressure for gas and water lines increased, and the duration of claim adjustment cut to
half (Fiel, 1999).14
(1) dS = E1 [(P1 –P 2)/P 1 ]{ 1+½ ×eD×[(P1 –P 2)/P 1]}
where eD = (dQ / dP)(P1 /Q 1) is the elasticity of demand and E1 =P 1Q1. Equation (1) can
be used to measure changes in consumer surplus assuming different demand elasticities. If
demands were perfectly inelastic (eD = 0), which would mean that quantities had remained
unchanged, consumer surplus could be estimated as the difference in expenditure by means
of dS = E2 –E 1 (where E2 =P 2×Q1).
4.1 The data used in the estimates
The data used in the estimates come from the Household Expenditure Survey (EGH)
carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses in the Gran Buenos Aires
area between March 1996 and March 1997 (INDEC 1998).16 This survey contains
normalized monthly information on the income and expenditure of about 5,000
households, as well as demographic and personal characteristics of the family members,
availability of the utility networks and the use of these services by all the families surveyed
(the sample is representative of a population of 12 million people).17 This is the only
household expenditure study conducted in the country during the 1990s, and in the
preceding decade, there was only one completed survey (1986-7). In our case, it was not
feasible to use the 1986-7 survey because of data discrepancies, resulting presumably from
that year’s high rate of inflation.
With the aim of measuring changes in the welfare of consumers with varying living
standards, households were first categorized according to their total family income. This
was corrected according to OECD methodology, which adjusts for economies of scale in
consumption to reflect the size and composition of each family. The households were then
grouped into income quintiles. The poorest and richest families are concentrated in the first
and the last quintiles, and intermediate income families are represented by the middle
quintiles.18 Next, quantities consumed per each household (not reported in the survey but
needed for calculating pre and postreform expenditures) were estimated by making
q={E·[1/(1+t)]-0.5·F}/V, where E refers to monthly expenditure, t are tax rates levied on
the services and F and V the (bimonthly) fixed and unit charges.19 Furthermore,
16 The EGH 1996/7 includes the population of Capital Federal and that of the following Partidos of the Gran
Buenos Aires: Almirante Brown, Avellaneda, Berazategui, Esteban Echeverría, Florencio Varela, General
San Martín, Hurlingham, Ituzaingó, José C.Paz, La Matanza, Lanús, Lomas de Zamora, Malvinas
Argentinas, Morón, Quilmes, San Fernando, San Isidro, San Miguel, Tigre, Tres de Febrero and Vicente
López.
17 Food consumption data were collected on a weekly basis, whereas other utilities, electricity for example,
bimonthly. Therefore, the normalized monthly expenses for food correspond to the costs tallied during the
week of the household survey, and electricity to the amount recorded for the 2-month preceding the survey.
18Total adjusted household income was obtained by multiplying total family income by a coefficient
calculated as the ratio of total quantity of declared and corrected members of the household. This last
quantity is a weighted sum in which the first adult equals 1, the other adult members 0.7, and 0.5 if they are
minors.
19 However, as the actual billing date of the reported expenditure is not known, tariffs used in the estimations
represent the averages for the quarterly period when the family was surveyed. Price changes throughout the
survey period were small and errors from this approximation are unlikely to be significant. In the case of15
expenditure for electricity and gas was adjusted according to Hancock and Waddams
Price’s proposal (1995) for correcting seasonal variations which may occur in conjunction
with the timing of the survey.20
The first three columns of Table 3 (which group households by income quintiles) show a
noticeable unequal income distribution. Half of the total income (48 percent) is
concentrated on the richest households, whereas the poorest receive only 5 percent of the
total. However, before evaluating the impact of the reforms, it should be noted that at the
time of the survey, about 12 percent of the households had unsatisfied needs, 19 percent
were below the poverty line, the unemployment rate was 18 percent, while GDP was rising
at a 5 percent rate annually and consumer prices at less than 1 percent annually.21 The
other columns in Table 3 and Figure 5 show the distribution of services and the level of
households’ consumption and expenditure on utilities.
Beginning with telecoms, this service reaches two-thirds of the households and the average
consumption is about 6.8 thousand pulses a year, which translates into an annual cost of
US$424, or 2.8 percent of the total family income. Income limits access to telecom
services—only 33 percent of the poorest families have a telephone at home compared to
66 percent of the middle income group and 90 percent of the richest quintile. Consumption
for the richest group is two and a half times higher than for the poorest households.
Expenditure is also more than double. Expenditure in telecom services for the richest
households represents 1.4 percent of total income, but in the case of the poorest families it
jumps to 5.9 percent.
Electricity service is ‘almost’ universal, 94 percent of the households are connected to the
grid (Figure 5). This ratio essentially highlights the small proportion of users in the lowest
income group and suggests that the main constraint to access is affordability. The average
annual consumption is 2.3 Mwh at an average cost of US$263, or 2.2 percent of the family
income. As with telecoms, the relationship in consumption between income groups and
pensioners with monthly incomes below US$150 (Decreto 679/95), the estimations also include the 50
percent discounts enforced with Decreto 532/88. This was applicable until 1997 when Decreto 319/97
replaced the discount with a direct payment to these beneficiaries. A 21 percent value added tax rate is levied
on all services. There is no other tax on telecom and water utilities, although water bills include an additional
2.67 percent charge to finance the ETOSS. In electricity, however, additional taxes for consumers residing in
the Partidos include 10 percent for the Impuesto de la Provincia de Buenos Aires al Servicio de Electricidad
(Laws 7,290/67 and 8,016/73), 5.5 percent for the Fondo Especial para Grandes Obras Eléctricas
Provinciales (Law 9,038), 0.6 percent aimed at financing the Santa Cruz utility (established by Law 23,681),
6.424 percent for the municipal sales rate and another 0.6424 percent for the provincial sales rate. For
residents in the Capital Federal, only municipal sales tax and the tax stipulated by Law 23,681 apply
(although in this case the rate for municipal sales tax is 6.383 percent). Taxes for piped gas consist of VAT
and a 9 percent charge for households in the Partidos (Law 9,266).
20 To that end, annual consumption for each family was estimated with Q = q·(QT /Q E)×12, where q stands
for the unadjusted quantities obtained as described earlier, QT is the mean unadjusted consumption over all
families with recorded expenditure on the service, and QE the mean for those interviewed during quarter E.
21 A household has ‘unsatisfied basic needs’ if there are more that three individuals living per room; there is
no lavatory or it does not flush water; the family has a school-aged child but he/she does not attend school,
and the like. The ‘poverty line’ is the value of a foodbasket (consisting of goods selected for their capacity to
adequately satisfy nutritional needs at minimum cost) and non-food goods and services that are normally
consumed by households (education, health and housing, for example).16
between the extremes is 2:1, but in this case expenditure differences are only 50 percent,
which translates into 0.8 percent and 4.5 percent of household incomes, respectively.
The gas network covers 83 percent of the households and a similar proportion of families
utilize the service. This implies that natural gas is used by 69 percent of the population.
The grid covers only 61 percent of the poorest households. In contrast, almost all the rich
have access to the network and a significant proportion are connected. Average household
consumption is 951m3 per year and the average expenditure US$248 representing
1.8 percent of total income. Furthermore, consumption and expenditure of the richest
families are double that of the poorest. Gas expenditure absorbs 0.7 percent of income in
the richest and 3.6 percent of the income of poorest households, respectively.
Finally, data for sanitation services show that water and sewerage networks reach
76 percent and 58 percent of the households, respectively, and that access increases with
income. Only 69 percent of the poorer families benefit from these services in contrast to
89 percent of the rich; proportions also fluctuate between 44 percent and 76 percent in the
case of sewerage. Furthermore, only 55 percent of the households declare expenditure on
these services, a proportion that varies between 43 percent for the first quintile and
73 percent for the fifth. The average annual expenditure on these services was US$141 at
the time of EGH and fluctuated slightly because most users pay a flat rate. The expenditure
for poorer families was on average US$110 and for the richest households US$170,
constituting 0,5 percent and 2,7 percent of their income, respectively. Unfortunately, the
prevailing tariff scheme for this service precludes the calculation of the quantities
consumed.22
22 We have verified that the number of customers and the consumption levels recorded by the EGH are
consistent with the information provided by the privatized companies. By the end of 1996, Telefónica de
Argentina and Telecom had registered 2.526 million residential customers, the electricity companies Edenor
and Edesur 3.195 million customers and Metrogas and BAN 2.737 million. Aguas Argentinas was providing
water and sewerage services to 6.6 and 5.2 million inhabitants, respectively. Electricity data reported by the
EGH and the companies is almost consistent, but moderate differences exist for other services, which seem to
be explained by the fact that coverage areas for the companies do not exactly match the area surveyed by the
EGH. A comparison of the information as given by the utilities companies and by the survey, indicates firms
reporting 10-15 percent higher coverage for telecom and gas, but 20 percent lower in water. This seems to be
explained by similar discrepancies in the population of the covered areas. Finally, with regard to households’
annual consumption, the mean levels of 2.3 mWh for electricity and of 951m3 for gas calculated from the
expenditure data in the survey are very similar to the 2.2 and 1.029 registered by the firms.17
Table 3
Household consumption of public services per income level in Buenos Aires metropolitan area(1) March 1996 to March 1997













































































































































































































Average(4) 4,188 100 2,295 6,841 424 2.8 3,158 2,348 263 2.2 2,381 951 248 1.8 1,868 – 141 0.9
Poorest 216 5 306 4,383 295 5.9 581 1,654 218 4.5 371 658 191 3.6 298 – 110 2.7
2
nd 418 10 367 6,031 382 3.5 622 2,056 253 2.4 392 813 224 2.1 305 – 125 1.6
3
rd 592 14 429 6,428 402 2.5 624 2,300 273 1.7 437 946 248 1.6 332 – 136 1.2
4
th 904 22 551 7,561 462 2.0 651 2,594 293 1.3 538 1,053 269 1.2 416 – 138 0.8
Richest 1,899 48 642 10,928 639 1.4 680 3,349 343 0.8 642 1,297 317 0.7 517 – 170 0.5
Pensioners 655 16 348 4,207 286 3.3 640 1,682 213 2.7 411 766 209 2.5 342 – 104 1.0
Source: Own elaboration based on data from INDEC (1998).
Notes: (1) The survey covers 3,424,000 households which represent 11.8 million people;
(2) Total family income per month ($1 = US$1);
(3) Current annual values, after taxes;
































Poorest 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile Richest Pensioners
(%)
Telecoms Electricity Natural gas Water Sewerage
A final look at the data also shows that the combined expenditure on all services appears
moderate for the rich, but represents a heavy burden for the poor, as it absorbs 4 percent
and 17 percent of their respective annual incomes. Moreover, average consumption in all
utilities increases with income but at a lower pace. In the case of natural gas, for example,
the poor consume only 658m3 per year while the rich use double the amount, even though
their income is ten-fold. This relationship of about ten-to-one between the percentage
change in household income and the quantities consumed seems to suggest that the
demand for natural gas has a significantly low-income elasticity. Finally, pensioner
households enjoy access to the services in similar proportions as the rich, but consume
quantities comparable to the poor. Despite pensioners benefiting from a reduced tariff
scheme, their expenditures in utilities still represented a significant proportion of their
income.
It is important to note that universal service obligations are not imposed on privatized
companies. Also no evidence of voluntary disconnection was found. Electricity and
telecom utilities have the obligation to supply but connection is not mandatory. Connection
to the sanitation network is compulsory, and complete coverage of the sanitation network
by the end of the concession is specified in Aguas Argentinas’ contract. In gas, connection
to the grid is not mandatory, and extension of the system is not compulsory for distribution
firms. When potential entrants need additional gas lines, the distribution company
operating in the area has the primary responsibility for carrying out the necessary
expansion. However, if the primary company reneges on its responsibility, ENARGAS
authorizes another one interested in doing the work, and stipulates the rules of operation
and linkage to the existing distribution or transportation grid. This option has created many
co-operatives and local firms that service small towns and rural areas, and tariffs in these
locations are regulated by ENARGAS according to the same principles applied to other
distribution firms.19
4.2. Changes in consumer surplus
The first step in the analysis was the calculation of the initial and final levels of
expenditure on each service and for each household in the sample using pre- and
postreform tariffs (Table 2) and the quantities consumed (which were estimated as
described earlier). Then, changes in consumer surplus were measured using equation (1)
for different three scenarios, based on the assumption that the price elasticities of demand
ranged between 0 and –1, as supported by the limited evidence that is available. Table 4
gives the results in terms of estimated expenditure on each service for December 1999 and
consumer surplus changes for each group, measured in pesos ($1 = US$1) and as a
proportion of the total adjusted household income. (These expenditures differ from those
reported in Table 3, which include taxes and were directly obtained from the EGH).
The results for the first scenario on telecoms show that the average welfare gain for
consumers is US$53 per year, which equals to 0.18 percent of the family income. These
welfare changes, however, are unevenly distributed because the rich have gained US$109
or 0.24 percent of their income while the poor have lost US$8 or 0.16 percent of theirs.
This can be explained by the fact that the fall in the pulse, compounded by the rental
increase, triggered a reduction in the average tariffs for high-demand users, but an increase
in the tariffs paid by the low-demand users. The results for the second scenario are
different, as welfare changes for all consumers are positive. As the demand is more elastic,
price-induced changes in consumption patterns are greater and consequently, as prices fall
or rise, the same do welfare changes. For the same reasons the direction of the results in
the last scenario is similar to those of the second, although the gains are larger and in
almost all cases proportional to household income.
Results for the electricity sector are similar to those of the telecom sector, and the
progression of tariffs has benefited all residential customers except low-demand customers.
This effect is probably associated with the development of competition in generation and
the adoption of a suitable regulatory framework prior to the reforms. In fact, Table 4 shows
that in each scenario, average consumers not only spend less than prior to reforms, but that
they also enjoy an increase in welfare that ranges from US$26 to US$33, depending on the
elasticity of demand. As gains increase with income, they basically favour the higher-
income groups. However, when compared to income, welfare changes are relatively
similar across all income groups, except for the poor. Overall, this suggests that the losses
of the poor induced by the significant increase in real tariffs for low-demand customers can
be amply offset by the gains—achieved from the reduction in the variable charge—of the
richest quintile with high demand.
The increase of US$24 in the annual expenditure for the average natural gas consumer
would have provoked a welfare loss equivalent to 0.17 percent of its income. But the
impact has been different between groups because the loss represented less than 0.07
percent of the rich’s income, but it jumped to 0.37 percent of that of the poor, for example.
Those results suggest that the changes brought with the reforms imposed a relatively
higher burden on the low-income groups, which are moderate consumers, in relation to that
placed on the high-income groups, who are the most intensive users. In the other two
scenarios, the costs as well as the welfare losses would be lower because consumers are
more price responsive and would therefore transfer consumption to other energy goods.20
Table 4
Changes in consumer welfare (based on estimated consumption for 1996/7)


















Average 480.71 52.56 0.18 63.71 0.28 70.59 0.33
Poorest 323.96 -7.59 -0.16 5.99 0.18 9.56 0.27
2nd quintile 376.58 14.32 0.14 25.58 0.26 30.05 0.31
3rd quintile 440.20 38.56 0.27 49.00 0.35 54.82 0.39
4th quintile 493.38 58.95 0.27 68.11 0.31 75.52 0.35
Richest 637.01 108.91 0.24 121.04 0.27 131.45 0.30
Pensioners 357.21 13.72 0.03 18.31 0.08 22.51 0.13
Electricity
Average 179.44 25.82 0.10 29.23 0.12 32.64 0.15
Poorest 133.56 -1.14 -0.10 0.40 -0.06 1.94 -0.03
2nd quintile 158.51 12.08 0.12 14.55 0.15 17.03 0.18
3rd quintile 177.55 23.64 0.17 26.88 0.19 30.13 0.21
4th quintile 195.49 35.52 0.17 39.57 0.19 43.61 0.21
Richest 227.01 55.94 0.13 61.46 0.15 66.98 0.16
Pensioners 147.87 7.48 -0.02 9.61 0.00 11.73 0.02
Natural gas
Average 182.16 -23.74 -0.17 -22.81 -0.16 -21.88 -0.15
Poorest 130.61 -15.79 -0.37 -15.22 -0.35 -14.65 -0.34
2nd quintile 152.56 -19.21 -0.21 -18.49 -0.20 -17.76 -0.19
3rd quintile 173.83 -22.50 -0.16 -21.63 -0.15 -20.75 -0.15
4th quintile 191.49 -25.18 -0.12 -24.18 -0.11 -23.19 -0.11
Richest 227.61 -30.70 -0.07 -29.46 -0.07 -28.22 -0.07
Pensioners 154.46 -19.46 -0.23 -18.73 -0.22 -17.99 -0.22
Water and sewerage
Average 159.19 -48.56 -0.10
Poorest 132.11 -45.80 -1.85
2nd quintile 145.44 -47.16 -0.97
3rd quintile 154.53 -48.09 -0.66
4th quintile 156.78 -48.32 -0.44
Richest 184.55 -51.15 -0.22
Pensioners 147.56 -44.67 -0.74
Source: Own calculations based on data from INDEC (1998).
Note: (1) Using December 1999 tariffs, before taxes ($1 = US$1);
Finally, users of water and sewerage services have experienced an average welfare loss of
US$49 during private ownership, a loss equivalent to 0.10 percent of their total annual
income (although it needs to be said that Aguas Argentinas, at the time of transfer, reduced
prevailing tariffs by 26.9 percent, which was the winning bid). Furthermore, losses have
been more or less even across groups, fluctuating from US$46 for households of the first
quintile to US$51 for the fifth (which is explained by the fact that prices are unrelated to
consumption). Therefore, tariff adjustments and the introduction of additional charges
(oriented to finance universal service and environmental improvements and named SU and21
MA, respectively) constituted relatively a heavier burden for users with limited resources,
for whom these tariff changes represented 1.85 percent of their income, but only 0.22
percent for the rich.
Considering all four utilities together but focusing on the scenarios that correspond to the
most plausible demand elasticities (-1 for telecom, -0.5 for electricity and piped gas, and 0
for sanitation services), tariff changes of privatized utilities have meant for the average
consumer of the fifth quintile an annual welfare gain of US$112, but a welfare loss of
US$51 for the poorest quintile. These constitute a gain of 0.25 percent of the annual
income of the rich, but an income loss of 2 percent for the poor. Furthermore, to examine
the joint impact of these reforms on the economic welfare of all residential consumers in
Gran Buenos Aires area, the number of consumers recorded at the inception of private
management (Table 5) was multiplied by the welfare changes of the average consumers for
the most plausible scenarios mentioned above. This calculations yielded a total welfare
gain of US$90 and US$103 million for the telecom and electricity services, but a loss of
about US$58 and US$80 million for gas and sanitation services, respectively.
4.3 Consumer surplus for the newcomers
The welfare changes presented so far are based on households already utilizing the utilities
at the time of reforms. Thus, the analysis in this section attempts to measure benefits to
new consumers accessing the services during the expansion triggered by private
management. These benefits can be approximated by deducting the cost of access to the
network (net of other costs associated with an alternative service) from the present value of
consumer surplus. Alternatively, the benefits can be approximated as the difference
between annual consumer surplus less the annualized value of corresponding access costs.
Information on the income of the newcomers by quintiles was not available; therefore to
measure total benefits related to privatization, we just multiplied the results obtained for a
typical user by the number of new entrants.
Continuing with the assumption of a lineal demand function of the form Q = b0 +b 1×P, the
consumer surplus for the newcomers is calculated using the following expression:
S=½ × (PM –P 1)×Q1 =-[ 1 /( 2 ×b1)]×Q1
2
where PM is the maximum price when the quantity is zero, P1 the tariff paid and Q1 the
quantity consumed by the newcomer.23 But recalling that the elasticity of demand could
also be expressed as eD =b 1× (P1/Q 1) and substituting b1 in the last expression, it becomes:
(2) S = - (P1×Q1)/2 ×e
which can be used to estimate welfare gains for the newcomers in scenarios with different
price elasticities.
The number of new customers whose enlistment into the system can be attributed to the
reforms have been estimated under two scenarios. The first assumes that newcomers
represent the total number of entrants achieved by the private firms from the time of the
transfer to the end of 1999. The second is a ‘counterfactual’ scenario which estimates the
23 The corresponding inverse demand function is P = (b0 /b 1)–( 1/b 1)×Q and consequently PM =-( b 0 /b 1).22
potential increase in customers on the assumption that public firms had expanded at
historical rates but without the effects of privatization. The number of customers thus
estimated is then subtracted from the total number of subscribers assumed to have resulted
from privatization. The first three columns of Table 5 show the number of residential
customers calculated according to these scenarios. The last three columns show access
costs, as well as a summary of consumer surplus as obtained with equation (2). Additional
details for each utility are given below.
Private telecom companies have installed more than 1.5 million lines since the transfer to
accommodate the increase in the area’s total number of residential customers from 1.3 to
2.9 millions. However, had ENTel expanded at the earlier rate, its residential customer-
base would have reached 2 million by the end of 1999. Thus, according to these
calculations the number of new entrants attributed to reforms is only 909,000. Either way,
the annual consumer surplus for a ‘typical newcomer’ (based on the average expenditure
given in Table 4 and on the assumption of an unitary elasticity of demand) is US$241
(-$481/2-1.0). When this is corrected by the annualized cost of access of US$234 (Table
5), consumer surplus falls to US$7.24 However, it should be mentioned that this gain
should be further adjusted to consider that new entrants might have used public phones as
an alternative, though lack of data prevented this calculation.
Table 5
Consumer surplus for the average newcomer in the Gran Buenos Aires consumer
surplus and costs per year(0)
No. of utility subscribers (‘000) Access costs(3)






Telecoms 1,274 2,920 1,646 2,011 75 159 241
Electricity 3,516 3,997 481 4,055 17 26/93 179
Gas 2,550 2,955 405 3,310 97 38 182
Water(4 5,758 7,669 1,911 6,435 32 12 175
Sewerage(4 4,663 5,744 1,081 5,735 32 12 175
Source: Aguas Argentinas (2000), Colomé (1996), ENARGAS (1999), INDEC (2000) and Secretaría de
Energía y Minería (2000).
Notes: (0)Measured in pesos ($1 = US$1). (1)Initial users of telecom services as of Nov. 1990; electricity as
of Dec. 1991, gas as of Dec. 1992 and water and sewerage as of May 1993. (2) Annual growth rate
of the public utilities (estimated for the decade before their privatization): ENTel 5.2%, SEGBA
1.8%, Gas del Estado 3.8% and OSN 1.6% for water and 3.0% for sewerage. (3)Connection fee
and rental charge. (4)Per 1,000 (on average, three members per household).
24 For basic telephony, connection costs are calculated from the average connection charge of US$750
(established by the Secretaría de Comunicaciones) and using an annual discount rate of 10 percent yields
US$75. For piped natural gas, it is estimated to be the sum of the cost for an internal installation of two
appliances US$919 and the connection rights (US$50) in 1999. Based on the presumption that an external
grid already exists and using same the opportunity costs, then we would get US$97. In electricity, the
connection charge varies between US$50 and US$490, depending on whether the connection is common or
special, if the area is single-phased or three-phased, and if it is an underground connection or not (Estache
and Chisari, 2000).23
In comparison, there seems to be no welfare gain for 481,000 new electricity subscribers, a
fact that reflects its wide coverage before reforms and the existence of numerous illegal
connections at the time of the transfer. The magnitude of the latter problem encouraged
private companies to draw up a four-year agreement with the provincial government and
municipalities to normalize the situation. This resulted in 10,000 new electricity metres
being installed a month (Estache and Chisari, 2000) and the signing-up of 436,000 illegal
entrants as regular subscribers.25 Although efficient from an allocative point of view, the
change merely generated a welfare transfer from the new paying customers to those who
had financed the deficits of the public utilities (taxpayers and customers with tariffs above
economic costs). The new subscribers, of course, were no longer at risk from precarious,
limited and unsafe service. The number of legalized connections basically corresponds to
the number of new entrants, and this can be interpreted as there being no significant
welfare change in either scenario.26 Table 5 summarizes the consumer surplus and access
costs.
The development of piped gas distribution is similar to electricity, in that the 405,000 new
customers registered under private ownership could have been enlisted by Gas del Estado
in the counterfactual scenario. But in that event, there would have been no welfare gain for
new entrants. The potential benefits of entering the network would have been offset by the
loss of consumer surplus from consumption of bottled gas. In fact, when one takes into
account that the average annual gas expenditure per consumer is US$182 for piped
distribution versus US$135 for bottled, and assuming further that there are no access costs
on bottled gas, and that demand elasticities are -0.5 in both cases, the substitution of
bottled gas by piped gas provides an annual net welfare gain of US$47 (US$182–
US$135).27 However, when network access costs of US$135 are included in the analysis,
the result becomes negative. Nevertheless, it is possible that the entry of new customers
can be explained by the fact that quality gains were perceived to exceed, or at least equal,
the negative welfare effect. Furthermore, an alternative estimate of welfare gains based on
the savings derived from such a substitution produces a similar result.28
Water and sewerage services have had uneven behaviour pattern throughout the period of
private take-over because the growth rate for the water customer base was similar to that of
25 If one assumes that one-third of the reduction in grid loses reflect better technical efficiencies and two-
thirds the conversion of illegal connections into regular subscribers, the 18 percent observed drop (for
example, Edesur reported a 26 percent decrease in 1992 and 8 percent in 1999, for example) applied to the
5.6 thousand Gwh sold by SEGBA to its residential customers in 1991 would equal to a ‘recuperation’ of
636 Gwh. This surplus power, if sold to customers with an average consumption of 1.6 Mwh, would account
for the 398,000 ‘new users’.
26 Although a reduction of demand for those users whose willingness to pay is less than the opportunity cost
of providing the service would increase social welfare.
27 This calculation assumes that ‘gas demand’ moves upwards or to the right due to an improvement in the
quality of the good; as shown by Spulber and Sabbaghi (1996) for water.
28 Replacing bottled gas with piped gas would enable the average ‘bottled’ consumer to reduce his costs up
to 40 percent for the same calorific value, implying a savings of US$54 a year (the price of bottled gas with
tax is US$1.10 per kilogram versus US$0.32 for piped gas. A kilogram of bottled gas equals 1.4m3 of piped
gas). These facts help to explain why about 25 percent of the families with possibilities for connecting to the
natural gas network still use bottled gas.24
OSN, albeit with a higher rate for sewerage. As previously, the welfare change for a typical
newcomer is calculated by comparing the consumer surplus net of access costs against an
alternative service, which is assumed to consist here of a pumped well, or cesspool and
septic tank. Similarly, the net welfare gain of a connection to water or sewerage network
can also be calculated by subtracting the surplus of alternative services from that of the
new ones, and correcting the result for access costs. If the average Aguas Argentinas
customer spends US$105 a year on water and US$45 on sewerage, and the annual cost of a
pumped well and septic tank is US$30 and US$80, respectively, access to the water
network would give a net benefit of US$81 assuming a demand elasticity of -0.3 but a
welfare loss of US$86 for sewerage, because in this case the net surplus is eroded by the
access costs.29
Although evidence suggests that the welfare increase for new residential telephone users in
the Gran Buenos Aires area have been important, it reached only US$12 million per year in
the first scenario and less than one million in the second, probably because rental
adjustments captured the consumer surplus. Changes in the electricity sector have also
been minimal because of the universal nature of the service before the reform and because
reform converted, to a great extent, illegal users into regular customers, which merely
implies interpersonal welfare changes (although social welfare may have increased).
Welfare gains in the piped gas sector have diminished because consumers giving up the
benefits of bottled gas were faced with large access costs. Finally, benefits from the
sanitation services were mixed. Rapid expansion of the water network had provided to
more than 0.5 million households a welfare gain fluctuating between US$52 million a year
in the first scenario to US$33 million in the second, but significant access costs to the
sewerage network caused important losses to the new users.
6. Conclusions
The privatization of public utilities in Argentina can be explained—as in many other
countries—by the negative impact that these services had on some macroeconomic
variables which provoked the frequent need to use public funds to finance operating
deficits. This was accompanied by a general dissatisfaction with management performance,
and by the difficulties governments faced in controlling such firms which translated in
their resistance to competition to improve their economic efficiency. The adoption of a
privatization programme was possible due to the transformation of monopolistic activities
into competitive ones thanks to developments in technology and more importantly, because
public opinion was more liable to believe that the state should leave market oriented
activities to the private sector and concentrate on areas where private involvement could
not be possible.
Privatization, as implemented by the Argentinean government at the end of the 1980s
mainly involved authorization from the congress, the splitting up of the state-run
companies and the design of regulatory frameworks. However, as reforms were introduced
in an era characterized by hyperinflation, recession and a significant fiscal deficit, initial
29 The construction cost of a pumped well is US$2,500 and that of cesspool US$1,000, whereas the annual
operating costs (for the electricity to operate the pump and for removals) reaches to US$30 and US$160,
respectively (Abdala, 1997).25
transfers were motivated by fiscal concerns without sufficient attention to the structure of
the markets. For all these reasons, telecom services operated under monopolistic
conditions, under a weak regulatory regime. Later, a more active participation by the
congress and the design of more elaborate regulatory norms paved the way for a more
competitive environment. This appears to have been the case for the energy utilities. The
water and sanitation services concession that took place under the urgent need for private
involvement seems to be an exception.
During private management, companies changed their sources of revenue by restructuring
the two-part tariff scheme, usually with a rise in the fixed charge. In telecoms, the rental
increased 50 percent whereas the price of the pulse fell by 10 percent. In electricity, both
fixed and variable charges rose 50 percent and 17 percent for low-demand customers,
while corresponding fixed charges for high-demand consumers remained almost
unchanged and variable charges declined by 33 percent. Tariff increases in piped gas were
less important but the unit price was more dynamic that the standing charge. They
increased less than 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Tariffs for water and sewerage
services were more stable because the tariff structure was maintained and prices only rose
10 percent. During this period, however, the number of customers increased and some
quality improvements were observed.
The impact of the reforms upon consumers welfare was measured in this paper by
considering the changes in welfare of the initial consumers and the surplus of the
newcomers. Results suggest that the direction as well as the magnitude of residential
consumers’ welfare changes vary across services (as evidenced by the welfare gains
achieved in telecom and electricity services, but losses experienced in gas and sanitation).
Magnitudes, in all cases, also change according to demand elasticity. Furthermore,
although the effect varies in the different groups, reforms seem to have affected vulnerable
households more severely, or provided the least benefit to this group, perhaps because of
changes in fixed tariffs. For all users as a group, gains would have represented 0.04 percent
and losses 0.03 percent of total income.
Benefits to newcomers also seem to vary across services. The expenditure level of the
average consumer and the relative importance of excess demand prevailing at the time of
the reform have had little significance in telecomunications because the substantial rental
increase captured almost all the surplus of the new consumers. Gains would also be
minimal in the case of electricity because of the universal character of this service and
because most newcomers were illegal users converted into regular customers. It appears
that gains in gas have not been important because for the majority of new users the benefits
from lower unit prices for piped gas were offset by high access costs to the network. In
water and sanitation services, in contrast, the rapid expansion of the water network induced
important welfare gains, and according to simple calculations, the benefits to new users
vary between 0.03 percent and 0.02 percent.26
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